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EMINENT DOMAIN: JUST COMPENSATION WHEN
THE CONDEMNOR ENTERS BEFORE
INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
The problem of establishing just compensation for land which
a condemning authority" appropriates before instituting the pre-
requisite proceedings has long plagued American courts. Courts,
often within the same jurisdiction, seem irreconcilably divid-
ed on the measure of compensation due a landowner whose
land has been invaded by a condemning authority before the filing
of condemnation proceedings. 2 Some courts have not even at-
1. Few jurisdictions have made a conscious distinction between the
state and corporations acting upon delegated governmental authority.
Therefore, throughout this paper the terms "condemning authority" and
"condemnor" are used without distinguishing whether the particular body
in question is a state or a corporation. It should be noted, however, that
there is some authority for distinguishing the type of condemnor involved.
In Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1952), the
court said:
[Where] a private corporation vested by law with a portion of the
sovereignty of the state in its grant of the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain, it is not thereby clothed with an immu-
nity not possessed by others who trespass upon the property of pri-
vate citizens and must answer for its trespasses in the same man-
ner as any other trespasser.
Id. at 70.
2. The division of authority is basically polar in nature. The fol-
lowing courts have ruled that the landowner is entitled to the market
value of the land at the time the condemnor invades: Jones v. New Or-
leans & S. Ry., 70 Ala. 227 (1881); Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry. v. Yount, 7 Colo.
App. 189, 42 P. 1023 (1895); Daniels v. Chicago I. & N. Ry., 41 Iowa 52
(1875); Weir v. St. Louis F.S. & W. Ry., 40 Kan. 130, 19 P. 316 (1888);
Doyle v. Kansas City & S. Ry., 113 Mo. 280, 20 S.W. 970 (1892); Kings-
land v. New York, 4 N.Y.S. 682, 21 N.Y.S.R. 715 (1889); Donaldson v. Bis-
mark, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942); State v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352
P.2d 478 (1960).
The following courts have ruled that the landowner is entitled to the
market value o the land at the time proceedings are instituted: San Fran-
cisco & S.J. Ry. v. Mahoney, 29 Cal. 112 (1865); Lafayette M. & B. Ry.
v. Murdock, 68 Ind. 127 (1879); Hampden Paint & Chemical Co. v. Spring-
field A.&N. & K.C. Ry., 124 Mass. 118 (1879); State Roads Comm'n v. Or-
leans, 239 Md. 368, 211 A.2d 715 (1965); Fish v. Chicago St. P. & K.C. Ry.,
84 Minn. 179, 87 N.W. 606 (1901); Louisville N.O. & T. Ry. v. Hopson, 73
Miss. 773, 19 So. 718 (1896); Nichols v. Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 135 N.E.
291 (1922); Faulk v. Missouri River & N.W. Ry., 28 S.D. 1, 132 N.W. 233
(1911); Texas Western Ry. v. Cave, 80 Tex. 137, 15 S.W. 786 (1891); Rich-
mond & M.R. Co. v. Humphreys, 90 Va. 425, 18 S.E. 901 (1894); Distler v.
Grays Harbor & R.S. Ry., 76 Wash. 391, 136 P. 364 (1913); Brickles v. Mil-
waukee Light, Heat & Traction Co., 134 Wis. 358, 144 N.W. 180 (1908). See
also Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1038 (1965).
tempted to formulate a general rule, preferring instead to decide
each case upon its own facts.3
The gravity of the uncompensated condemnee problem is illus-
trated by the fact situation of Cruell v. Jefferson Parish.4 A sur-
veyor's error resulted in the building of a highway over uncon-
demned land which belonged to a private citizen.5 The landowner
did not discover the intrusion until four years later. After dis-
discovery she brought an action to be compensated for the taking.6
The value of the property had increased by more than $19,000 be-
tween the time of the invasion and the time proceedings were in-
stituted.7 The condemnor contended that its liability was lim-
ited to the market value of the land at the time of the invasion.8
The landowner, however, sought the market value at the time her
proceedings were instiuted.9 Each party based his respective claim
upon a different prior decision of the state's supreme court.10
This Comment shall examine the problem of compensating a
landowner for property which has been invaded by a condemning
authority before the institution of proceedings. The applicability
of traditional eminent domain principles and the varied rationales
propounded by the courts in deciding cases like Cruell will be dis-
cussed. An alternative approach shall be suggested and a proposal
for legislative action offered.1 '
The related controvery which has arisen in the normal con-
demnation proceeding as to whether property should be valued at
the time the proceeding is instituted or at the time the award is
made shall be considered only where relevant to the specific topic
herein explored.
12
3. Compare Newglass v. St. Louis A. & T. Ry., 54 Ark. 140, 15 S.W.
188 (1891) with Memphis & L. Ry. v. Organ, 67 Ark. 84, 55 S.W. 952 (1899);
cf. Patterson W. & N.Y. Ry. v. Kambah, 47 N.J. Eq. 331, 21 A. 954 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1890); Trimmer v. Pennsylvania P. & B. Ry., 55 N.J.L. 46, 25 A. 932
(Ct. Err. & App. 1892).
4. 216 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1968).
5. Id. at 606.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 608.
9. Id. at 607. (Cruell made an alternative demand for the value at
the time she learned of the invasion. The court dispensed with this addi-
tional difficulty by indicating that the market value was the same at the
time the invasion was discovered as at the time proceedings were insti-
tuted. Id. at 608).
10. A.K. Roy Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 238 La. 926, 117 So. 2d 60 (1960)
(market value at time of invasion); Koerber v. New Orleans, 228 La. 903,
84 So. 2d 454 (1955) (market value at time of proceeding). See notes 91-98
and accompanying text infra.
11. A discussion of the mechanics of both condemnation and inverse
condemnation proceedings is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
detailed treatment, see 6 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMMENT DOMArN
§ 24.1-28.34 (3d ed. 1965). A discussion of valuation problems arising in
claims against the United States under the so-called "Tucker Act" is also
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Pittle, Suits Against the U.S. for
Taking Property Without Compensation, 55 GEo. L.J. 95 (1967).
12. See Note, Date of Taking in California Condemnation Proceed-
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1. ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE LANDOWNER 1 3
The problem of the uncompensated condemnee is brought be-
fore the courts in two ways. Either the condemnor discovers his
error and brings a belated condemnation proceeding 14 or the land-
owner discovers the presence of the condemnor and brings an ac-
tion for compensation.' 5 Consideration of the forms of action
available to a landowner, whose land has been possessed by a
condemnor without compensation, will show that the courts tend to
treat all such actions as equivalent to a condemnation proceeding.
Irrespective of the form of action instituted by the parties, courts
have chosen to determine the measure of a landowner's compensa-
tion by the application of normal condemnation principles. Such
principles must be adapted to the situation at hand.'6
Although equity was once unable to enjoin a trespass, 17 it has
been held that an injunction will lie against a condemning author-
ity which has entered private property without compensating the
landowner.' 8 In most instances, however, courts will grant the in-
junction as a final resolution of the dispute only if the condemning
authority could not have obtained the condemned land through a
normal pre-invasion condemnation proceeding. If the landowner
seeks an injunction, the court may either convert the action directly
into one against the condemnor for the requisite compensation, 19 or
grant a temporary injunction with the provision that it will be-
come permanent if the condemnor does not institute proceedings
within a specified length of time.
20
It has also been held that a landowner can bring an ejectment
action if the condemnor has entered without observing the neces-
sary procedural safeguards. 21 As with the injunction, however, the
landowner who seeks ejectment will usually be granted the rem-
edy he requests only if there is an inherent defect in the proposed
ings: A Proposal for Change, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 773 (1969); Note, Updating
Time of "Taking" in Condemnation Proceedings in Oklahoma, 4 TULSA L.J.
95 (1967).
13. For a complete discussion of the landowner's remedies see 6 J.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DoMIN § 28.11-28.321(2) (3d ed. 1965).
14. See, e.g., State v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
15. See, e.g., Cruell v. Jefferson Parish, 216 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1968).
16. See notes 43 to 111 and accompanying text infra.
17. Anderson v. Town of Groveland, 113 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1959). See
also H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 132 (2d ed. 1948).
18. See H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 132 (2d ed. 1948).
19. State Dep't of Highways v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724 (Alas. 1966).
20. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Stanley, 237 Ark. 664, 375
S.W.2d 229 (1964).
21. See Rosenblatt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 398 Pa. 111, 157
A.2d 182 (1959).
condemnation itself. Courts have developed the equitable device
of "conditional ejectment" which gives the condemnor a reasonable
time in which to bring the proper condemnation proceedings before
the actual ejectment will be executed.
22
A few courts have held that the condemnor's entering raises an
implied promise to pay and therefore limit the landowner to an ac-
tion in assumpsit to recoup his pecuniary loss.2 3 The assumpsit
cases have been subjected to criticism. Some jurisdictions hold
that the contract to pay which is implied from the condemnors' en-
tering of the land is purely fictional and therefore consider the as-
sumpsit action to be improper.24 Other jurisdictions have found
that the condemning authority's officers are not competent to indi-
vidually bind the authority to a valid contract and therefore hold
that their actions cannot bind the authority to an implied con-
tract.2 It should be noted that those courts which have adopted
the assumpsit action have employed the implied contract reasoning
only to decide the form of action. The landowner's recovery is not
decided under contract law, but upon the court's interpretation of
the principles of just compensation.
26
The action of mandamus has even been employed as a remedy
for the landowner.2 7 The traditional stricture against using manda-
mus to determine title to land 28 has either been ignored com-
pletely 29 or waived in the interest of justice.
30
The action of trespass has been frequently held to lie in the
uncompensated condenee situation.31 The courts have reasoned
that if the condemning authority acts outside the statutory and
constitutional limitations, its entry is nothing less than a trespass.
This view is accurately represented-by the case of Cochran Coal Co.
v. Municipal Management Co.,3 2 in which the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court said:
The rule is clear, however, that a public or private corpora-
tion, although invested with the power of eminent domain,
is a trespasser when it undertakes to appropriate private
property without adopting the requisite condemnation res-
olution and making or at least tendering compensation or
posting a bond. 'Where the power to take exists, it must
22. Id. at 127, 157 A.2d at 186.
23. See Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d 656 (1943);
Housing Authority v. Savanah Iron & Wire Works, 90 Ga. App. 150, 82
S.E.2d 244 (1954); Dugger v. State Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 317, 342
P.2d 186 (1959); Kuhl v. Chicago Ry., 101 Wis. 42, 77 N.W. 155 (1898).
24. See State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 47, 323 P.2d at 696.
27. May v. Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 111 S.E.2d 804 (1960).
28. Id. at 538, 111 S.E.2d at 808.
29. State v. Preston, 170 Ohio St. 24, 166 N.E.2d 748 (1960).
30. May v. Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 111 S.E.2d 804 (1960).
31. See Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 P. 465 (1929);
Felton v. Wateree Power Co., 123 S.C. 488, 115 S.E. 586 (1922).
32. 380 Pa. 397, 110 A.2d 345 (1955).
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be exercised according to law.' [Citation ommitted] .3
Courts which permit the trespass action must face the problem
raised by the doctrine of sovereign immunity which frequently bars
tort suits.3 4 A line of decisions has developed, however, which
holds that the constitutional requirement of compensation for the
taking of private property for public use removes the immunity.35
The trespass theory is also attacked on the ground that the con-
demnor is incapable of committing a trespass because of the unex-
ercised, but still present, power of eminent domain. In Great
Northern Railroad v. Washington,3 6 the Washington Supreme Court
held:
When taking private property for public use, the state acts
in its sovereign capacity. It goes not as a trespasser in-
spired by selfish or unlawful motive, but as one taking
without malice or intent to do wrong, and presumptively
for the public good.
37
It has been held that the landowner is entitled to the market
value of the land at the time of the invasion plus the trespass dam-
age of loss of fair rental value for the period between the invasion
and the proceedings.
38
A few states have provided by statute,3 9 and others by inno-
vative case law,40 a special form of landowner's action for the situ-
ation in which the condemnor enters into possession without com-
33. Id. at 401, 110 A.2d at 347.
34. See Bryant v. State Highway Comm'n, 233 Ark. 41, 342 S.W.2d 415
(1961); State v. Colorado Postal Tel. Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939);
Lambert v. McDowell Co., 103 W. Va. 37, 136 S.E. 507 (1927).
35. See Griswold v. Town School Dist., 117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829
(1952); State ex rel. Slade v. Jones, 182 Wash. 94, 45 P.2d 30 (1935).
36. 102 Wash. 348, 173 P. 40 (1918).
37. Id. at 353, 173 P. at 42.
38. Fish v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry., 84 Minn. 179, 87 N.W. 606 (1901).
39. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-22 (1965):
The state of New Mexico or any agency or political subdivision
thereof, including the state highway commission, and any person,
firm or corporation authorized by the Constitution and laws of
this state to exercise the right of eminent domain who has hereto-
fore taken or damaged or who may hereafter take or damage any
private property for public use without making just compensation
therefore or without instituting and prosecuting to final judgment
in a court of competent jurisdiction any proceeding for compensa-
tion thereof, shall be liable to the owner of such property, or any
subsequent grantee thereof, for the value thereof or damage thereto
at the time such property is or was taken or damaged, with legal
interest to the date such just compensation shall be made, in an
action to be brought under and governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure of this state. ...
See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1711 (1968).
40. See, e.g., Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38,
296 P.2d 401 (1956).
pensating the landowner. This proceeding, the so-called "inverse
condemnation proceeding," is in effect the statutory condemnation
proceeding found in the normal eminent domain situation but which
is begun by the landowner. 41 The principles of the condemnation
action are employed as the basis of this action.
42
The actual effect of any of the aforementioned actions, with the
possible exception of the strictly interpreted trespass action, is only
to get the parties into court. After establishing that an action
lies, the courts have attempted to adapt the principles of the normal
condemnation proceeding to the atypical situation before them. It
is submitted that the division of authority as to the measure of a
landowner's compensation for land which has been invaded before
condemnation proceedings are instituted is not a result of different
actions having been brought, but rather of some variance in the
courts' adaptation of the standard compensation principles to the
abnormal situation. It is therefore necessary to consider the com-
pensation principles spawned by the normal condemnation pro-
ceeding and to explore their applicability to the case of a condem-
nor who has entered into possession without instituting the normal
proceedings.
II. JUST COMPENSATION IN THE NORMAL
EMINENT DOMAIN SITUATION
The taking of private property for the use and benefit of the
general public by a governmental body, or by a private corporation
acting under delegated governmental power, is a broadly accepted
yet widely litigated sovereign prerogative. In dealing with such a
potent prerogative, it is essential that the concepts of a "right" and
a "power" be distinguished. This is necessary because the relation-
ship between the condemnor and the condenee is a vital element
in the discussion of the problem at hand. The nature of the con-
demnor-condemnee relationship is grounded upon the determina-
tion of whether the sovereign enters the condemnee's land as of
right or in the exercise of a power.
A "right," in the substantive use of the word, has most fre-
quently been defined as "that which jurists denominate a 'faculty';
that which resides in a determinate person, by virtue of a given law,
and which avails against a person (or answers to a duty lying on a
person) other than the person in whom it resides. '4 3 The essential
element here is the phrase "by virtue of a given law." It is this fac-
tor which distinguishes the prerogative of eminent domain from
the concept of a "right" with its correlative presumption of a "duty"
resting upon another. The prerogative of eminent domain is not a
41. Satate v. Hollis, 379 P.2d 750 (Ariz. 1963).
42. Id. at 751.
43. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 1486 (4th ed. 1968), quoting J. AUSTIN,
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE § 264 (1954).
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creature of law, but rather is restricted by law.44
A "power," on the other hand, has been defined as a liberty or
authority reserved by, or limited to, a person to dispose of real or
personal property, for his own benefit, or benefit of others, or en-
abling one person to dispose of an interest which is vested in an-
other.45 The key phrase in this definition is "authority reserved by."
When this phrase is considered in light of the tenurial heritage of
Anglo-American law, it indicates that "power" is the proper desig-
nation for eminent domain. Thus, the individual landowner who
has a right in his property is liable to the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, but he owes no unqualified duty to sur-
render his land as he would in the face of a sovereign right.
46
The power to condemn private property for public use, while
an inherent attribute of sovereignty, has been subjected to self-im-
posed limitations. The Constitution of the United States provides:
[N] or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.
47
The individual states are expressly bound by the following lan-
guage ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. ' 48 These limitations are
echoed in most of the individual state constitutions.
49
44. Mesa v. Salt River Project, 92 Ariz. 91, 373 P.2d 722 (1967); State
v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 561, 143 A.2d 571 (1958); Public Utility District v. Inland
Power Co., 64 Wash. 2d 122,390 P.2d 690 (1964).
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY, 1332 (4th ed. 1968); see, e.g., Hupp v.
Union Coal & Coke Co., 284 Pa. 529, 533, 131 A. 364, 365 (1925).
46. See generally 8 T. COWAN, AMERICAN JUmsPRUDENCE READR, 110-
124 (1956).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. (a) "Due Process": ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. II,
§ 7; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; COLO CONST. art. IV, § 25; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art.
I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. I,
§ 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9;
Ky. CONST. § I; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6a; MD. CONST.
art. 23; MASS. CONST. art. X; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 14; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONSr. art.
III, § 27; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 15; N.J. CoNsT.
art. I, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 17; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 7; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; R.I. CoNST. art. I,
§ 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 19; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7; VT. CoNsT. ch. I,
art. 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6.
(b) "Just Compensation": ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 18; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 17; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST.
To combine a workable and effective process for the exercise of
the eminent domain power with compliance with the constitution-
ally imposed limitations on that power, each state has codified a set
and definite procedure for proper condemnation. Generally, the
condemnor is required to apply to either an administrative or to a
judicial body for an official determination of the propriety of the
decision to condemn and also for the determination of the measure
of "just compenstion."5' 1
The entering into possession by a condemning authority before
proceedings are instituted bypasses the normal condemnation pro-
ceedings at which the measure of just compensation is determined.
art. I, § 14; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 12; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 8; FLA. CONSr. art. X, § 6; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAWAII CONST.
art. I, § 18; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 21; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 4;
Ky. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; ME CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST.
art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. art. X; MicH. CoNsT. art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 13; MIss. CONST. art. III, § 17, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 28; MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 14; NED. CONST. art. I, § 21; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 8;
N.H. CoNST. pt. I. art. 12; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20; N..M CONST. art. II, § 20;
N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; OHIo CONST. art I, § 19;
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23; ORE. CONST. art. VI, § 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 13; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; TEx. CONSr. art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. I,
§ 22; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 58; WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 16; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 19; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 13; Wyo. CONST.
art. I, §§ 32-33.
50. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 1 et seq. (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240 et seq.
(1962); AEZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1111 et seq. (1947); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-101 et seq. (1947); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1237 et seq. (West 1954); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1 et seq. (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1
et seq. (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6101 et seq. (1953); FLA. STAT.
§ 73.012 et seq. (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-101 et seq. (1933); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 101-1 et seq. (Supp. 1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701 et seq. (1947);
ILL. REn. STAT. ch. 47, § 1 et seq. (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1701 et seq.
(1946); IOWA CODE ANN. § 471.1 et seq. (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-101
et seq. (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 416.010 et seq. (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 19:1
et seq. (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3001 et seq. (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 33A, § l et seq. (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 1 et seq. (1932);
Mica. CoMP. LAWS § 213.21 et seq. (1943); MINN. STAT. § 117.01 et seq.
(1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2749 et seq. (1942); Mo. RnV. STAT. § 523.010 et seq.
(1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9901 et seq. (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 37.010 et seq. (1957); NEV. REv. STAT. § 37.010 et seq. (1957); N.H. RnV.
STAT. ANN. § 422:14 etc. (1953); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-1 et seq.
(1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-1 et seq. (1953); N.Y. CONDEM. LAW § 1
et seq. (McKinney 1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-1 et seq. (1943); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-15-01 et seq. (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2709.01 et seq.
(Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 1 et seq. (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 281.010
et seq. (1953); PA. STAT. tit. 26, § 101 et seq. (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 22-9-2 et seq. (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-201 et seq. (1962); S.D. CODE
§ 37.4001 et seq. (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1401 et seq. (1955); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 3264 et seq. (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 et seq.
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 221 et seq. (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-
46.1 et seq. (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.04 et seq. (1951); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-1-1 et seq. (1966); Wis. STAT. § 32.01 et seq. (1965); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-743 et seq. (1957).
51. See generally 6 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 24.2
(2)-27.2(2) (3d ed. 1965).
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The applicability of the compensation principles developed within
the normal condemnation proceeding to the problem posed by the
uncompensated condemnee situation must now be explored.
A. Just Compensation
52
The guiding principle behind the concept of giving the land-
owner "just compensation" for any property taken by the sovereign
is reimbursement. 53 "Reimbursement" is defined as that measure
of compensation which will put the landowner in as good a pe-
cuniary position as he would have been in had his land not been
taken.54 To transcend the basic problem of establishing an equiva-
lent pecuniary value for a non-pecuniary property, the courts have
adopted the rule that the landowner is entitled to the market value
of his property at the time of the taking.5 5 "Market value" is uni-
formly defined as the price in money that the property which is
taken could be sold for on the open market under fair conditions
between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy
with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser.5 6 In deter-
mining the market value, any benefit or detriment wrought by the
fact of the condemnation itself is not regarded as an aspect of the
value of the property.5 7 The courts frequently consider the effect
the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adapt-
able would have on the land's market value if it were offered for
private sale.55
The concept of market value as a measure of just compensation
is well settled. An essential element of that measure, however, is
less clearly defined. There is a difference of opinion among the
courts as to what constitutes the "taking" necessary to raise the re-
52. A discussion of the many fine distinctions found in the area of
property valuation in eminent domain is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See generally 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1-106
(2d ed. 1953).
53. 2.953.15 Acres of Land v. United States, 350 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.
1965); Del Vecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 147 Conn. 362,
161 A.2d 190 (1960); Board of Educ. v. 13 Acres of Land, 50 Del. 387, 131
A.2d 180 (1957); State v. Waggoner, 319 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. App. 1959).
54. Del Vecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 147 Conn.
362, 161 A.2d 190 (1960).
55. United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1958);
Southern Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So. 2d 308
(1959); Suffield v. State, 93 Ariz. 152, 375 P.2d 236 (1962); Department of
Pub. Works v. Lotta, 27 Ill. 2d 455, 189 N.E.2d 238 (1963); Dague v. Depart-
ment of Highways, 418 Pa. 340, 211 A.2d 527 (1965).
56. See cases cited note 55 supra.
57. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Stanley, 237 Ariz. 664, 373
S.W.2d 229 (1964).
58. State v. 7.026 Acres of Land, 466 P.2d 364 (Alas. 1970).
quirement for compensation and to thereby set the time for fixing
the measure of that compensation.
B. The Taking
Court definitions of "taking" are a continuum between two dis-
tinct poles. This confusion is a result of the courts having been
faced with cases in which a property right rather than property it-
self was involved. These cases differ from the uncompensated
condemnee situation in that in the former it is only the infringement
of a single property right with which the courts are concerned. In
the uncompensated condemnee situation, the courts must deter-
mine the measure of compensation for a taking of the condemnee's
property as a whole. In searching for a measure by which to de-
termine what invasions of private interests are compensable under
the constitutional limitations upon the eminent domain power,
courts have analogized further and further from the concept of
"taking" as used when land is absolutely condemned. Thus, one
pole of the definitional split can be illustrated by the following
statement from the California Supreme Court in Southern Pacific
Railroad v. Railroad Commission:"0
The 'taking of property without due process of law' within
the meaning of the constitution is not restricted to a mere
change of physical possession, but includes a permanent or
temporary deprivation of the owner of its use. The princi-
ple is thus stated by Lewis on Eminent Domain as follows:
'If property then consists not in tangible things them-
selves, but in certain rights in and appurtenant to those
things, it follows that when a person is deprived of any of
those rights he is to that extent deprived of his property,
and hence that his property may be taken in the constitu-
tional sense though his title and possession remain undis-
turbed, and that it may be laid down as a general proposi-
tion, based upon the nature of property itself, that when-
ever the lawful right of an individual to the possession,
use or enjoyment of his land are in any degree abridged or
destroyed by reason of the power of eminent domain, his
property is pro tanto taken and he is entitled to compensa-
tion.' It is also clear that to take the use of property is to
take property within the meaning of the constitution.60
Other courts have held that there is no taking within the con-
stitutional definition until title passes.6' The position that there
can be no taking until title passes is based upon the reasoning that
until the landowner is divested of title, he has lost nothing and the
condemnor has gained nothing.6 2 Implicit in the statement that
the landowner has lost nothing is that the landowner maintains the
59. 13 Cal. 2d 89, 87 P.2d 1055 (1939).
60. Id. at 117, 87 P.2d at 1069, quoting LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 65
(3d ed. 1909).
61. See Koerber v. New Orleans, 228 La. 903, 84 So. 2d 454 (1955).
62. See generally White v. State, 201 Va. 885, 114 S.E.2d 614 (1960).
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ability to convey as well as the right to bring an action against the
condemnor. The argument with regard to the right to bring an ac-
tion against the condemnor is undoubtedly correct.68  There
is, however, substantial question as to the state of a land-
owner's title for conveyancing purposes once a condemning au-
thority enters into possession. The title question has not been di-
rectly determined by the courts. In Terrace Hotel v. New York,
6 4
however, a New York Supreme Court held that the filing of an ap-
propriation map by the superintendent of public works under an
ordinance which was later held unconstitutional caused a compen-
sable cloud upon the landowner's title.68 The court held that even
though the filing itself was legally void, the landowner's title was
clouded because the public is entitled to believe the acts of the gov-
ernment's agents to be proper. 66
In cases involving land which is made the subject of an execu-
tory land sale contract before the threat of condemnation arises,
some courts have held that the subsequent threat of condemnation
so clouds the vendor's title that his performance of a covenant to de-
liver a clear title is impossible.6 7 These courts would obviously hold
that the actual entering into possession of a condemning authority
has at least the same detrimental effect upon the landowner's title
as does a mere threat of condemnation.
Courts which hold that there is no taking until title passes
could, of course, uphold their position by reasoning that the land-
owner can remove any cloud from his title by bringing an action
against the condemnor. However, unless some inherent defect
would have precluded the condemnor's ability to obtain the land
through proper condemnation proceedings, the result of a suit by
the landowner would most probably be a condemnation of the
property.6 8 In practical result, the landowner's ability to convey
is almost nonexistent.
This seeming flaw in the theory that there can be no taking un-
til title passes is of no consequence. The constitutional require-
ment is for a "taking of property" before the requirement of com-
pensation arises.69 Property is not the physical land itself but a
bundle of "certain rights in and appurtenant to" the land. 70 It is
63. See Cruell v. Jefferson Parish, 216 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1968).
64. 40 Misc. 2d 978, 244 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
65. Id. at 980, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
66. Id.
67. See Kares v. Covell, 190 Mass. 206, 62 N.E. 244 (1902).
68. See cases cited notes 14-42 supra.
69. See constitutions cited note 49 supra.
70. Southern P. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 13 Cal. 2d 89, 117, 87
P.2d 1055, 1069 (1939).
submitted that no one of the constituent attributes alone is "prop-
erty," yet it is "property" which must be taken. The condemnor's
invasion and usurption of possession deprives the landowner of
possession, use and enjoyment, but not the right to those component
parts of the concept of property. The right remains in the title-
holder who is, immediately upon any invasion, capable of bringing
an action against the invader for breaching the duty which is a
correlative of the right which remains in the title-holder. The
condemnor's invasion has given him actual possession, use and en-
joyment of the land, but not the right thereto and until that right
becomes vested in the condemnor, he has no "property" in the land
in question.
Adherence to the correct definition of "property" demands the
conclusion that there can be no "taking" in the eminent domain
situation until the condemnor is legally vested with title. This
position, however, has been attacked as overly technical and un-
realistic. 71 In essence, arguing that the proposition is invalid be-
cause it is overly technical avoids the issue. The proper definition
of "taking" is vital to the solution of the uncompensated condem-
nee problem. Therefore, it is the correctness rather than the tech-
nicality of the proposition which should prevail.
The courts have been induced to express varied definitions of
"taking" in the uncompensated condemnee situation because of a
factor present in that situation for which the normal condemna-
tion principles make no allowance. The concepts of compensa-
tion applicable to the normal condemnation proceeding presuppose
that all elements of the validity of the proposed taking as well as
the measure of just compensation are to be judcially determined
before the fact of the taking occurs. In the atypical situation, how-
ever, the fact that the proceedings are necessarily post-facto intro-
duces the necessity of determining which party should bear the risk
of the fluctuating land market. Courts have not been ignorant of
the uncertain nature of this market as can be seen in the following
passage from the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson
Municipal Airport Authority v. Wright:72
Use of the trial date as the time of taking is unrealistic in
that it ignores [Wright's innocence] as well as changes in
conditions occurring in the interim, such as fluctuations in
the general economy, changes in the character of the neigh-
borhood or in the property itself or in its surroundings. All
of these things are factors capable, at least, of affecting the
amount due as compensation.7 3
It is the element of risk which has caused the breakdown of
any attempt to directly and consistently apply the normal con-
demnation principles to the uncompensated condemnee situation.
71. See State v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
72. - Miss. -, 232 So. 2d 704 (1970).
73. Id. at -, 232 So. 2d at 714.
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The great differences in land values which can occur between the
time of the invasion and the time of the proceedings7 4 have caused
the courts to search for more than mere formalistic correctness.
This well intentioned deviation from formally correct reasoning
has led to a confusion of the trespass and condemnation actions
which is at the heart of the split of authority.
III. Tim CONFUSION OF TRESPASS AND CONDEMNATION
In State v. Stumbo,75 the Oregon Supreme Court held that the
date of actual entry should be considered the date of taking be-
cause it provides a certain and fixed time for making the requisite
valuation. 76 On the surface, the court's reasoning seems to be a
credible attempt to adapt the normal condemnation principles to a
new problem. However, in Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v.
Wright,77 the Mississippi Supreme Court advanced the same reason
as a justification for fixing the time of the proceedings as the time
of taking.7 s The fact that the same reasoning has been used to sup-
port contradictory holdings indicates there were other motivations
as the true bases of the decisions.
In Stumbo, the court encountered a situation in which the state
had built a highway over part of the condemnee's land. The in-
trusion was unintentional and unknown to the landowner.
7 9
Shortly before the running of the statute of limitations for adverse
possession, s0 the landowner discovered the intrusion and made a
claim for compensation. The state attempted to negotiate a settle-
ment but no agreement could be reached. Before the condemnation
proceedings could be begun, the Stumbo's "subdivided" their 16
by 200 foot plot into two inch squares. They began to sell these
squares on the market to create an inflated market value at the time
of the proceedings."' The court held that the date of entry should
be considered the date of taking after noting that the inflated con-
dition could not be allowed as a true measure of property value in
any alternative.8 2 The court noted that while its decision to hold
the time of the invasion as the "taking" would deprive the land-
owner of an opportunity to have a jury rule upon the reasonable
74. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
75. 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
76. Id.
77. - Miss. -, 232 So. 2d 709 (1970).
78. Id.
79. 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
80. Id. at 64, 352 P.2d at 479.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 65, 352 P.2d at 480.
rental value of the land for the period of the condennor's pre-
proceeding occupation, a case of true injustice would not likely arise
because the owner of land of any real value would not suffer in
silence as long as did the Stumbos. 3
The Stumbo court quoted with approval from Jones v. New
Orleans & Selma Railroad Company & Immigration Association: 
8 '
Just compensation for the land at the time of its taking
paid before or concurrently with its appropriation, was a
right of the appellant. If there was an entry upon, and ap-
propriation of the lands without having the compensation
ascertained, and making payment for it, there were reme-
dies to which he could have resorted, protecting himself,
regaining his possession, and compelling the ascertainment
and payment of the compensation. If he is negligent-if
he stands by in silence, suffering under it, the construction
of costly improvements, not necessary to the enjoyment of
the freehold, inconvenient to his use and occupation, valu-
able only to the party making them for the uses to which
they are dedicated-there is but little equity in a claim that
the measure of his compensation shall be increased by the
value of the improvements or that the time at which such
compensation is to be estimated should be varied .... 85
In Wright, the property right taken was an air navigation ease-
ment over the Wright's land. 0 Proceedings were timely instituted
but court delay prevented the proceedings from reaching the court
for over three years.87 The court noted:
Obviously in such a case, the taking necessarily antidates
the commencement of the suit by the owner, which must
be based on the premise that a taking has already occurred.
The cause of action accrues when the cause of action be-
comes due, which is at the time of the taking.
But a delay in the trial of the issues thereafter should not
affect the amount justly due as compensation for the prop-
erty or property right taken.
As the owner's right to claim compensation is immediate,
use of the date of filing as the date of taking is more realis-
tic and definitizes the time to which evidence is to be ad-
dressed both as to the nature and extent of the taking and
as to the amount of compensation due.88
Clearly, the idea of fixing a definite time is purely an ancillary
justification to the courts' basic motivation for reaching the deci-
sions which they did. Underlying the condemnation principles
which were enunciated as the bases for the decisions reached, can
83. Id. at 75, 352 P.2d at 483.
84. 70 Ala. 227 (1881).
85. 222 Ore. 76, 252 P.2d 483, quoting 70 Ala. 227, 231 (1881) (emphasis
in original).
86. - Miss. at -, 232 So. 2d at 710.




be seen a groping attempt to justly determine which party should
be made to suffer the risk of land market changes. Apparently
the real basis of each court's decision is a determination of which
party is more at fault for the delay in instituting proceedings. In
Stumbo, the court's disapproval of the actions and motivations of
the landowner can be sensed throughout the opinion,89 while the
"innocence" of Mrs. Wright is openly championed by the Mississippi
court o0
The use of the comparative fault determination as a basis for al-
locating risk can be seen throughout the cases which have been
decided on this difficult compensation issue. In Cruell v. Jefferson
Parish,9 1 the Louisiana Court of Appeals had to choose between two
of the Louisiana Supreme Court's prior decisions. Koerber v. New
Orleans,92 held that the land should be valued at the time of the
proceedings. A.K. Roy Co. v. Pontchartrain Levee Dist.,9 3 how-
ever, held that the value should be determined at the time of the
invasion. The Cruell court ultimately chose the time-of-the-pro-
ceedings decision in Koerber because that case involved a land-
owner who, as Cruell, was less culpable for the delay than the con-
demnor.9 4 A.K. Roy Co., the decision which held that the time of
valuation should be at the time of the invasion, involved a land-
owner who not only knew of the condemnor's invasion without
bringing proceedings, but who also tried to sell the land to an un-
knowing third party.95 In fact, the landowner only brought suit
after being sued by his vendeeY6 In an attempt to avoid the prece-
dent said by Koerber, the A.K. Roy Co. court said:
[W] here a property holder with full knowledge that its
property has been taken possession of by a public body for
purposes of constructing public works, stands by without
resistance or complaining, as was the case here, considera-
tions of public policy require that the owner shall not be
permitted to reclaim its property but shall be restricted to
a claim for compensation for the value of the property
taken and for damages to the adjacent land, if any, deter-
mined as of the date of the taking.
9 7
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals de-
89. See State v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
90. See Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Wright, - Miss.-,
232 So. 2d 709 (1970).
91. 216 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1968).
92. 228 La. 926, 84 So. 2d 454 (1955).
93. 238 La. 926, 117 So. 2d 60 (1960).
94. 216 So. 2d at 608.
95. 238 La. at 926, 117 So. 2d at 60.
96. Id. at 927, 117 So. 2d at 61.
97. Id. at 934, 117 So. 2d at 63.
cision in Cruell.98 The contorted reasoning exemplified by many
of the cases involving an uncompensated condemnee is a result of
the courts' failure to clearly distinguish the condemnation pro-
ceeding from the principles of the trespass action. The condemnor
has been stigmatized as a "naked trespasser"9 9 and a "wrongful pos-
sessor."'10 0 The condemnor has even been held liable for punitive
damages when the landowner was "blameless."''1 1 On the other
hand, when the landowner came before the court less than blame-
less, he has been classed as "negligent"'1 2 and in no better position
than the condemnor.103
The difficulties of the problem and the desire to provide con-
sistent case law has led the New Jersey courts to develop a unique
system. If the action be brought in equity, the property is valued
at the time of the invasion. 104 However, if the action be brought at
law, the property is valued at the time of the proceedings. 105 When
faced with a case in which one party relied upon the legal rule and
the other upon the equitable rule, 0 6 the court resolved the conflict
in the following manner:
The result of these conflicting rules seems to be that if a
corporation ... takes proceedings to condemn [the] lands,
the legal rule applies; but if the question of the value of
the land becomes involved in a suit in equity, the equitable
rule applies. 10
7
The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the rule that the land
should be valued at the time of the entry after making the following
statement:
Either rule is likely to operate harshly in special cases, as
well against the landowner as the corporation; but we
see nothing in the one contended for which indicates that
it would more often work harshly than either of the oth-
ers . . . .108
The lack of a clear definition of "taking" has thus provided an
avenue by which the confusion of tort and condemnation has en-
tered and clouded this area of the law. The courts' failure to dis-
tinguish the two actions is unfortunate not only because it has
98. 253 La. 640, 219 So. 2d 175 (1969).
99. Williams v. Henderson County Levee Dist., 58 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
100. See Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. v. Hopson, 73 Miss. 773, 19 So. 718
(1896).
101. Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 363 Mo. 751, 253 S.W.2d 785
(1952).
102. Jones v. New Orleans & Selma Ry., 70 Ala. 227 (1881).
103. See State v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
104. Doremus v. Patterson, 73 N.J. Eq. 474, 69 A. 225 (Ct. Err. & App.
1908).
105. Trimmer v. Pennsylvania P. & B. Ry., 55 N.J.L. 46, 25 A. 932
(Ct. Err. & App. 1892).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 49, 25 A. at 933.
108. Newglass v. St. Louis, A. & T. Ry., 54 Ark. 140, 15 S.W. 188 (1891).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
forced them to the limits of credibility when deciding cases upon
words of condemnation and theories of trespass, but also because the
trespass-damage concept is not amenable to the condemnation-com-
pensation theory. The normal recovery in a private law trespass
action presupposes that the landowner will regain full "property"
in the land in question. 09 This presupposition is usually inappli-
cable to the condemnation situation. 110 In the private law trespass
action the trespasser, though sometimes innocent, enters under no
right or power. It is only equitable that the allocation of any risk
should be decided against the trespasser. This is not the case in the
condemnation situation. The condemnor, whether the state or a
corporation acting under delegated sovereign power, enters the
land for the public welfare. The condemnor is vested with an in-
herent, if not exercised, power to rightly get what it has usurped
extra-legally.1 1' It is also questionable whether the deterrent ef-
fect sought in the private trespass action is desirable or even ef-
fective in an action against the sovereign.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Courts are unwilling to apply the formally correct yet possibly
harsh definition of "taking" to the uncompensated condemnee situ-
ation without buttressing their opinions with an ancillary device for
allocating the risk of land market fluctuations. The device the
courts have chosen is the comparative fault reasoning. Deciding
cases upon the comparative fault rationale has led to a confusion
of the trespass and condemnation actions. The result of the confu-
sion of the trespass and condemnation actions has been inconsistent
case law which is sometimes based upon rather contorted reasoning.
The courts have overlooked an alternative to the comparative
fault approach which would lead to more consistent, rational, and
just decisions in cases involving an uncompensated condemnee.
Some courts have recognized that the entry of a condemning
authority before the institution of condemnation proceedings raises
an implied promise to pay for that which is taken. 112 It is unfortu-
nate that the contract analogy has only been applied to the determi-
nation of the form of action to be allowed."83 If the sovereign in
exercising an inherent yet self-limited power enters private prop-
erty without instituting the compensation determining proceedings,
109. See C. McComvncK, DAMAGES § 126 (1935).
110. See cases cited note 13 supra.
111. See Jacobson v. State, 68 N.D. 259, 278 N.W. 652 (1938).
112. See cases cited note 23 supra.
113. See discussion under Section I of this Comment supra.
it has still indicated its intent to take. The condemnor's promise
to pay for what is taken is implied not from the acts of its officers,
but from its constitution. The legislative and court made laws is-
suing from the constitutionally implied promise to pay have set the
price at the fair market value at the time of the taking. The "con-
tract," however, is executory until the consideration is paid and the
title passes according to law.
114
The law of land sale contracts is no stranger to the allocation
of the risk of great property value fluctuations. The courts have
decreed that when an executory contract is formed, the equitable
interest in the property passes to the vendee.115 The vendor holds
only the title in trust as a security for the payment of the contract
price.116 If property which is subject to an executory land sale
contract is destroyed after the formation of the contract, the vendee
is still liable for the contract price.117 The vendee is still liable be-
cause he is the holder of the equitable, or greater, interest in the
property at the time of the destruction. 118 The title-holder has
by agreement parted with most of the bundle of relationships neces-
sary to the concept of property. The title and ultimate right to the
property remains in the vendor, but his exercise of that right is
qualified by the contract.
In addition to the common law tradition, statutory authority
speaks in favor of the vendee's assumption of any risks inherent in
the transaction. The Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Allocation of
Risk Act,'1 9 which has been enacted by ten states,'1 20 provides:
(b) If, when either the legal title or the possession of the
subject matter of the contract has been transferred, all
or any part thereof is destroyed without fault of the
vendor or is taken by eminent domain, the purchaser
is not thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price,
nor is he entitled to recover any portion thereof that
he has paid.'
2'
The land sale contract principles for allocating risk contemplate
the destruction or other drastic reduction of the value of the con-
tract's subject matter. However, in the uncompensated condemnee
situation there is no apparent reason why the same allocation of
risk principles should not also apply to property value increases.
114. See generally Martin v. John Clay & Co., 167 S.W.2d 407 (Mo.
App. 1943).
115. Arko Enterprises, Inc. v. Wood, 185 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1966); for
discussion of cases contra, see Annot. 27 A.L.R.3d 572 (1969).
116. 185 So. 2d at 736.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 737.
119. UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER ALLOCATION OF RISK ACT.
120. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1662 (West 1947); HAwArn Rsv. LAWS § 203-1
(1955); ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.1 (1965); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 565.701
(1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-37 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 201 (1961);
ORE. Rsv. STAT. § 93.290 (1953); S.D. CODE § 37.1807 (1939); Wis. STAT. §
235.72 (1965). See also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240a (McKinney 1944).
121. UNIFORM VENDoR AND PuRcHAsER ALLOCATION OF RISK ACT § lb.
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The allocation of risk principles are grounded upon a determination
of which party is in the position which requires him to bear the risk.
The nature of the risk involved is not at issue.
Like the vendee, the invading condemnor has all but the ulti-
mate right to the land. The condemnor's meeting of the constitu-
tionally imposed obligation to pay the market value of the property
at the time of the taking is a condition precedent to the landowner's
liability to convey full title.122 The constitutional requirement for
a "taking of property" before the duty to compensate arises deter-
mines when the land should be valued.123 There is no taking of
property until the landowner passes good title which obviously
must occur after the institution of proceedings. The taking occurs
at the time when title passes, therefore, the measure of the land-
owners's compensation must be the market value of the land at
the time of passage of title.
The constitutional mandate itself thus resolves the measure of
compensation issue. Within the framework of the constitutional
mandate, the land sale contract allocation of risk principles provide
the ancillary device desired by the courts. The condemnor-vendee
has usurped the equitable interests in the land. The risks must
therefore be borne by the condemnor. If the value of the land in
question increases between the time of the invasion and the time
proceedings are instituted, the condemnor must meet the obligation
to pay the market value at the time of the taking, that is, at the
time when title passes. 24 The principle that the landowner's com-
pensation should reimburse him for the land which is taken is satis-
fied. 125 The decision rests not upon culpability but upon contrac-
tual principles which are consistent with the principles of emi-
nent domain.
The contract rationale also supports the time-of-title passage
compensation rule when there has been a drop in land values be-
tween the time of the invasion and the institution of proceedings.
The aim of compensation is to place the landowner in the same pe-
cuniary position he would have been in had the land not been
taken. 126 It is true that the landowner in this situation will be paid
less than the land was worth at the time the condemnor entered.
Contrary to appearances, however, the landowner is not exposed to
the risk. He is still being paid the equivalent worth of his property
122. See cases cited note 44 supra.
123. See constitutions cited note 49 supra.
124. Del Vecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 147 Conn. 362,
161 A.2d 190 (1960).
125. See cases cited note 53 supra.
126. See cases cited note 54 supra.
when it is taken, that is, when title passes. If the landowner had
attempted to divest himself of his property interest before the
proceedings, the presence of the condemnor would have been dis-
covered and, if the land in question were valuable, objected to.
The use of the landowner's capacity to bring an action is not de-
terminative of the measure of his compensation. It merely negates
a claim on the landowner's part for compensation beyond the value
of the property he holds.
The element of comparative fault is thus removed as a basis
for deciding the cases. The contract analogy requires that the
condemnor pay the actual value of the land taken. It is submitted
that the contract analogy would enable the courts to determine the
measure of compensation upon a rationale more in harmony with
the principles of eminent domain than the heretofore employed com-
parative fault device
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
It is clear from the cases that American courts are bound to
the comparative fault approach to the problem of the uncompen-
sated condenmee. It has been seen that this trend is unsatisfac-
tory. It must be noted, however, that the legislatures have been of
little help to the courts in developing a better solution to the
problem.
The new Uniform Eminent Domain Code 27 provides an inverse
condemnation proceeding to meet the uncompensated condemnee
situation. 128 However, Section 505(E) of the new Code provides:
For the purposes of this section, there has been a taking
when the land has been actually entered and put to a pub-
lic use or some permanent structure has been erected upon
it. Extent of pecuniary injury or interference with the
owner's use shall not be considered elements determinative
of taking.
129
Although the proposed statutory determination that the time
of taking occurs upon the condemnor's actual entry would make
the court created comparative-fault approach inoperable, the de-
termination of "taking" as occurring at any time other than the
time of title passing is improper.130 The risk of serious loss is
placed upon the landowner in that the time for valuation of the
property is fixed at the time of the condemnor's entry rather than
at the time when the condemnor actually "takes" the property by
acquiring title to it.'8 ' The landowner may conceivably receive
far less than the actual value of his land when the condemnor fi-
127. 2 A.B.A. REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST, SECTION 365 (1967).
128. 2 A.B.A. REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST SECTION 380 (1967).
129. Id.
130. See cases cited notes 59 to 74 and accompanying text supra.
131. See cases cited notes 71 to 74 and accompanying text supra.
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nally effectuates a true taking by acquiring title to the land.132 It
is urged that the drafters of the new Uniform Code consider an
amendment to their work which would define the time of taking
as occurring at the time title actually passes from the landowner
to the condemnor.
The following is a suggested format for legislation designed
to cope with the uncompensated condemnee situation:
BE IT ENACTED THAT:
1. In all cases in which a condemning authority, whether the
State or a private or public corporation vested by the State
with the power of eminent domain, enters upon private
property without the institution of the proceedings required
by [appropriate section of state code]:
a. The condemning authority and/or the landowner, his
heirs and assignes, have an immediate right to apply
to [court of competent jurisdiction] for the institution
of condemnation proceedings in accordance with [ap-
propriate section of state code].
b. If the court [administrative body] determine that the
proposed taking be improper and not in accord with
[enabling section of state code] the condemnor shall be
ordered to remove from the premises of the landowner
and the landowner shall be entitled to be reimbursed
for the reasonable rental value of his land for the
period of the condemnor's occupation as determined by
[court or body to which condemnation proceeding
brought].
c. If the court [administrative body] determine that the
proposed taking be proper and in accord with [en-
abling section of state code] the court shall declare the
condemnor's entrance into possession of the land to
constitute an implied promise to pay just compensa-
tion. "Just Compensation" shall be defined as the rea-
sonable market value of the land in question at the
time of the taking. Such market value shall be exclu-
sive of any changes wrought by the condemnor or by
a condemnee with notice of the condemnor's presence.
"Taking" shall be defined as the time the condemnee
in accordance with law passes good title to the con-
demnor. "Notice" shall be defined as reason to know
132. See, e.g., Cruell v. Jefferson Parish, 216 So. 2d 604 (La. App.
1968).
of, as well as actual knowledge of, the condemnor's
presence.
2. The condemnation action as provided in [appropriate sec-
tion of state code] shall be the only action which may be
brought by either the condemnor or the landowner; and the
action, whether brought by the condemnor or the landowner
shall be governed by the procedure established in [appro-
priate section of state code].
CONCLUSION
A condemning authority's entrance into possession of private
property before the institution of condemnation proceedings raises
a difficult compensation problem. The compensation principles ap-
plicable to the pre-entry proceeding make no provision for the allo-
cation of the risk of land value fluctuation which is present in the
post-entry proceeding. The pre-entry compensation principles
are therefore not directly applicable to the post-entry situation.
In order to apply the pre-entry principles to the post-entry sit-
uation, the American courts have employed a comparative fault de-
vice to allocate the risk of land value fluctuations. The compara-
tive fault device has led to inconsistent case law and a frequent
abandonment of clear reasoning.
The adoption of a land sale contract analogy would provide a
clear and consistent device for the allocation of risk in the post-en-
try proceeding. The result reached through allocating risk on the
basis of a land sale contract analogy would be more consistent with
the eminent domain compensation principle of "reimbursement"
than the results reached through the comparative fault device.
To date, few legislatures have provided statutory guidelines for
determining the measure of a landowner's compensation in a post-
entry proceeding. The frequent occurrence of cases involving con-
demnors which have possessed private property without compen-
sating the landowner justifies immediate legislative action.
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